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Abstract  
We live in the era of mass technology and global 
society bombarded by information and now more 
than ever we need to understand and assess the 
nature of communication and what it relays. Basis 
for the use of power and resources distribution has 
thus changed and it became quite obvious that the 
new methods of dissemination of messages to 
great distances, at considerably greater speed, 
will fundamentally change the nature of human 
interaction. In the contemporary world, interest 
and care for manipulation of public opinion, 
forming of attitudes and influence on behaviour 
reached unprecedented levels. Hybrid threats and 
wars became a first-class security issue of 21st 
century, and a sign and an indication of the 
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security in the future. This work deals with theory 
and research of the term hybrid warfare and 
threats in Bosnia and Herzegovina through a 
sociological field survey of the population aiming 
to inductively establish the level of public 
knowledge on it.  
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Barnett highlights that during the Cold War, security to the 
USA and the USSR meant national security from the military 
and ideological threat by one against the other, while the basic 
strategy for achieving the security was building and 
maintaining superiority. In that context, Giacomo Luciani 
claims that the national security was most commonly defined 
as the ability to withstand aggression from abroad. Mutimer 
states that claiming something is a security issue means 
claiming that it represents the most serious threat possible, 
existential threat, and if such threat is accepted, it will result 
in serious political consequences. In the post-Cold War 
context, perhaps the best definition of security was given by 
Soroos, who defined security as “people’s conviction that they 
will continue enjoying the things of utmost importance for their 
survival and well-being“ (Soroos, 1997, p. 236). Definition of 
national security according to the last-century discourse was 
put into question by the new “contemporary” security 
reference concepts. According to the “new” national security 
culture of 21st century, the first three positions of the present-
day global security threats are taken by the phenomena such 
as terrorism, hybrid warfare and, what we would call, the state 
of a failed state. Also, the very current economic issue of 
sustainable development, having considerable 
consequences for the national security too, is introduced to 
the discourse.   
Christoper Dent explain how, in the post-Cold War context, 
(economic) security is focused on the shift from geopolitics to 








































 super-powers, and eventually, from the political-ideological 
competition to economic competition. Stremlau observed on 
time: “we are entering an era when foreign policy and national 
security will increasingly revolve around our commercial 
interests, and when economic diplomacy will be essential to 
resolving the great issues of our age“ (Stremlau, 1994, p.18).  
Many believe that in the information era, economics and 
politics are no longer organised in a big, bureaucratic 
hierarchy, but as a loosely structured horizontal network. 
Basis for the use of power and resources distribution has thus 
changed and it became quite obvious that the new methods 
of dissemination of messages to great distances, at 
considerably greater speed, will fundamentally change the 
nature of human interaction. 
Two important events marked 2014 as a turning point in the 
history of international security: Russian interference in the 
Ukrainian crisis and the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and 
Iraq. The biggest focal trait and common point of these 
unrelated events is not necessarily the relative success of 
political actors (Russia and the Islamic State) in conquering 
territories, but their success in using the information space 
through the effective use of new communication opportunities 
(Friedman, Ofer; Kabernik, Vitaly and Pearce, James C., 
2019, p. 1). The Information Revolution, taking place over the 
last two decades, has finally manifested itself in a way that 
political actors conduct, interpret and perceive conflicts. The 
concept of hybrid warfare was one of the first attempts by the 
professional community to address this rapidly changing 
character of conflicts, where smart use of new technologies 
to influence the hearts and minds of the targeted public offers 
considerably better results than the real action, Friedman 
said. 
Russian strategists and political scientists emphasise two 
main aspects that characterise the nature of the post-Cold 
War era confrontations: 1. with a view to crush an opposing 
nation through gradual erosion of its culture, values, and self-
esteem; and 2. emphasis is rather placed on the political, 
information (propaganda) and economic instruments than on 
the physical military force (Friedman, Ofer; Kabernik, Vitaly 





































Hybrid threats and hybrid wars of 21st century  
As early as 1996, the US Marine Corps Commander, General 
Charles Krulak, in his speech at the Royal United Services 
Institute in London, said that the future of warfare was not the 
child of the Desert Storm, but the stepchild of Chechnya and 
Somalia (Krulak, 1996, p. 25). The concept of hybrid warfare 
describes a situation where external controlling force 
introduces potential protesting masses (otherwise unaware of 
being exploited) and different types of destructive opposition 
forces (e.g. terrorists, extremists and criminal groups) to the 
forefront of fight against opposing political regimes (Panarin, 
2016). Thus, by waging a hybrid war, the external controlling 
power gains enormous operational opportunities to achieve 
its military and political goals without escalation into a full-
fledged conventional conflict. Hybrid wars are characterised 
by the simultaneous incorporation of different modalities of 
warfare - conventional, irregular and terrorist, according to 
Frank Hoffman. He further adds that these multi-modal forms 
of warfare can be conducted by both state and non-state 
actors and the crucial difference is that they can occur at the 
same time and at the same place, and have non-linear 
multiple domains above and beyond the physical, including 
electronic, cyber or even more abstract cognitive or virtual 
elements. Another major characteristic of the hybrid quality is 
the combination of tactics and atypical means, such as crime, 
which is used to maintain the hybrid power, support disruption 
of the targeted nation, and prolong conflict. These 
combinations are not a mere coincidence; they are 
deliberately combined into a strategy designed to produce 
synergistic effects. 
In other words, hybrid warfare, a combination of non-linear 
actions by the opponent, is not a product of a revolutionary 
impulse in the military realm, but simply a specialised model 
that offers more advanced methods and a better structure 
needed to achieve specific military and political goals, claims 
Filimonov. This is particularly the case where an external 
governing force (an international entity) needs to minimise the 
risk of conventional confrontation and employs various 
destructive forces, providing them with various types of 
situational support such as camouflaging the presence and 
participation of military contingents or by providing a 
superficial (information) cover up for covert subversive 








































 According to Hoffman, blurring the manner of warfare, blurring 
the identities of those fighting and the technologies brought in 
produces a wide range of diversity and complexity we refer to 
as hybrid warfare (Cf. Hoffman, 2007, p. 14). Hybrid threats 
incorporate a full range of modes of warfare, including 
conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, and 
terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, 
and criminal disorder (Ibid., 29). He defined hybrid threats as: 
“Any adversary that simultaneously employs a tailored mix of 
conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and 
criminal behaviour in the same time and battle space to obtain 
their political objectives. (Hoffman, 2010, p. 443). 
Hybrid threats are part of a transitional state of hostilities that 
is close to the direct application of armed violence but is 
commonly defined as a non-military threat, a possible form of 
an introduced insurgency by the opponent (Friedman, Ofer; 
Kabernik, Vitaly and Pearce, James C., 2019, p.61). 
Hybrid war is a multidimensional phenomenon that integrates 
several aspects of combat - military, information, economic, 
political, and socio-cultural into one domain. What makes it 
characteristic is a combination of military and non-military 
influences that simultaneously extend across multiple 
battlefields and therefore require well-organized multi-vector 
resistance. 
Multifaceted operations combine military measures (irregular 
insurgent tactics, use of special forces, information and 
cyberspace warfare, economic and political pressures) with 
civilian aspects of combat (public protests) (Nevskaya, 2015, 
pgs. 281-284). The civilian component, accompanied by a 
range of destructive techniques for dismantling political 
regimes, plays one of the most important roles in hybrid 
conflicts. Public protests, recently known as coloured 
revolutions, is a term that refers to specific techniques used 
to organize a coup and establish external control over the 
political situation in the target country. This is commonly 
achieved by artificially created political instability, where 
political blackmail is used to exert pressure on the 
government and where protests by opposition groups 
represent the strongest destabilising factor. As the demands 
of the protesters receive more media coverage, this allows for 
introduction of new political actors who put forward carefully 
designed political demands in order to bring the situation to a 
higher level of political confrontation. Therefore, a coloured 





































employment of information warfare methods, where 
intelligence agencies, special forces and other military 
formations capable of changing the course of events, play a 
very important role, according to Filimonov. Therefore, the so-
called coloured revolutions become the initial level of a much 
larger hybrid warfare. 
Russian theory of hybrid warfare (Gibridnaya voyna) claims 
that it aims to destroy the political cohesion of the enemy from 
the inside by using carefully designed hybrids of non-military 
means and methods that reinforce political, ideological, 
economic, and other social divisions within the opponent's 
society, thus leading to its political collapse. 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
concludes that hybrid warfare involves: "the use of military 
and non-military tools in an integrated campaign designed to 
surprise, seize initiative, and gain psychological and physical 
advantage by utilizing diplomatic means; sophisticated and 
accelerated information, electronic and cyber operations; 
covert and occasionally open military and intelligence 
operations; and economic pressure” (Military Balance 115, 
no. 1, 2015, p. 5). 
Mikhail Delyagin, Director of the Institute of Globalisation 
Problems, emphasizes the geopolitical importance of hybrid 
warfare, which he believes is a euphemism for global 
competition. He points out that "hybrid war is a fight that seeks 
to destroy an opponent, completely eliminate the 
independence of its governance system and put it under total 
control. A hybrid war seeks to reduce an adversary country 
(from its status as an independent state) to a territory under 
your rule” (Friedman, Ofer; Kabernik, Vitaly and Pearce, 
James C., 2019, p. 30). He further states that the means 
employed to that end are propaganda, bribe, political intrigue, 
espionage, political killings, and the staging of civil unrest. 
The new information doctrine describes the information 
environment as a synergistic interaction of three dimensions: 
physical with infrastructure and links of information networks; 
informative, representing the actual material transmitted 
through physical networks; and cognitive, where the human 
brain gives meaning to a piece of information, and which has 
been described as the most important of the three (Armistead, 
2010, p. 57). 
In recent years, the British military has been navigating 








































 psychological and media operations are united behind holistic 
efforts to achieve clearly defined goals. This stems from the 
belief that changing attitudes through informative action is not 
enough. It increasingly emphasizes the goal at the expense 
of means and a sharpens the military focus on the result of 
behavioural change. This focus is still on the effects, but some 
influences now reach beyond the propaganda distribution of 
information influence distribution to combine with the 
intentional manipulation of the circumstances or conditions in 
which people act and make decisions (Briant, 2015, p. 64). It 
is no longer just about winning the hearts and minds, that is, 
"whether the Afghan like ISAF soldiers is irrelevant to the 
influential campaign, which simply seeks to change 
behaviour, not opinion" (Rowland and Tatham, 2010, p. 2). 
Matt Armstrong goes on to say that the phrase should now 
sound like a fight for the hearts and wills of people because 
the will to act is what matters. He points out that it does not 
matter whether someone likes you or not, the goal is to 
change that someone's behaviour. One of the leading thinkers 
in this field, Nigel Oakes, says that the behavioural revolution 
has happened inasmuch that the military now understands 
that changing human behaviour is the ultimate goal. A 
behavioural approach can potentially engage a wide range of 
information-related and other activities that only superficially 
appear to be unrelated to the desired final outcome to create 
behavioural changes among the targeted audiences. This 
includes assessing the circumstances under which behaviour 
will change and then using the influential activities to induce 
those circumstances, that is, to manage them. The desired 
change in the behaviour will not be apparent from the 
undertaken activities and the true intentions will be obscured 
by the process from an observer. It seeks to create a situation 
where the target of persuasion begins to make the "right 
decisions" without being aware that those decisions are the 
propagandist's wishes, Mackay says. The credibility of a 
propaganda message often requires the relative invisibility of 
a campaign within the global media environment. 
Information warfare is an explicit and implicit interaction 
through information between different systems for the 
purpose of gaining certain benefits in the material sphere, 
argues Sergey Rastorguyev. He further adds that an 
information strike is carried out using the information 
weapons, i.e. such means that enable the intended actions to 
be carried out by transmission, processing, generation, 





































A significant aspect of Russian online information and 
psychological operations is the use of the so-called "trolls" 
(people-controlled) and "bots" (automatically-controlled). This 
broad system of fake accounts on social networks helps 
provide the necessary points of view in some debates by 
distracting and altering public attention or suppressing 
unwanted opinions. Their mimicry is complicated to detect 
because they accurately and faithfully simulate the behaviour 
and emotions of common people. As a method of information 
presentation, they are quite effective for the domestic and 
external environment and have become an integral part of the 
Russian information-psychological operations and 
information conflicts, as pointed out by Oxana Timofeyeva. 
The main methods of information presentation for forming 
appropriate public opinion, as well as for modifying 
behavioural practices, were conceptualised during the 
information-psychological confrontation by Yury Kuleshov: 
1. Straightforward lie aiming to misinform the domestic and 
international audience; 
2. Cover up of critical information; 
3. Dissolution of important information in a plethora of data; 
4. Simplification, confirmation and repetition (suggestion); 
5. Terminology substitution: using concepts and terminology 
with unclear meaning or suffering qualitative changes, making 
it difficult to form a real picture of an event; 
6. Making certain types of information and journalism 
categories a taboo;  
7. Image recognition: well-known politicians or famous 
persons can participate in a political event and thus influence 
the worldview of their fans; 
8. Providing negative information, which garners more 
response from the public than the positive information 
(Fridman, Ofer; Kabernik, Vitaly and Pearce, James C., 2019, 
p. 158). 
The so-called new wars theory claims that modern wars are 
qualitatively different from those of the past. Israeli military 
historian Martin van Creveld argues that modern wars are no 








































 professional armed forces, but involve a range of non-state 
actors including bandits, guerrillas and terrorists. He also 
argues that topics surrounding identity, such as ethnicity, 
religion, and gender, have become more central to conflicts 
than the traditional political and economic issues on which 
traditional analyses of war have been based. Kaldor agrees 
with Creveld, pointing out that new wars should not be 
confused with civil wars because new wars are confused and 
complicated and blur the lines between internal and external. 
Domestic violence can be perpetrated by external participants 
and can often be transnational links between state and non-
state actors. As such, conventional concepts of conflict 
between states and within states are inadequate to explain 
contemporary conflicts, Kaldor believes. He states that the 
number of civilian casualties cannot be reliably determined at 
all in new conflicts. 
Military theorist Evgeny Messner argues that in the future, the 
battle lines of conflict will be dissolved across the territories of 
conflicting countries, thus transforming political, social and 
economic aspects into the predominant dimensions of war. At 
the same time, a greater role will be given to the destructive 
influences on the civilian population: 
"Every conflicting party will create and nurture partisan 
movements within its opponent's territory, promoting various 
opposition and defeatist parties and offering them ideological, 
material, financial, and propaganda support. All available 
means and methods would be employed to encourage civil 
disobedience, sabotage, subversion, and terror...” (Cf. 
Messner, 2004, p. 57). Sergey Konopatov and Vladimir Yudin 
believe that the new wars have a "velvety" hidden nature as 
they are more violent, intense and faster than previous ones. 
A significant feature of new wars is their longevity, and the 
reason for this persistence lies in the fact that participants in 
new wars often profit more politically and economically from 
committing violence rather than from simply winning. Kaldor 
emphasizes another important feature, namely, that old wars 
were associated with state-building, while new wars are a 
common opposite, they tend to contribute to the dismantling 
of a state and are often responsible for the downfall of states 
(Cf. Kaldor, 2013, p. 3). 
Information operations and media as means  
Fifty years ago, political efforts were about the ability to control 





































about creating and destroying credibility (Report of the 
Defence Science Board Task Force on Strategic 
Communication, September 2004, p. 20). The position of 
information in relation to national security was described by 
Neilson and Kuehl through the definition of information base: 
"Use of information content and technology as strategic 
instruments to shape fundamental political, economic, 
military, and cultural forces on a long-term basis to influence 
the global behaviour of governments, supra-governmental 
organisations and societies for the purpose of supporting 
national security” (Neilson and Kuehl, 1990, p. 40, in 
Kolobara, 2017, p. 81). Information has always been an 
element of power and often viewed as an enabler or 
component of support, not as a decisive factor in the conduct 
of operations; however, in this new era, it has the possibility 
considered to be crucial for the success of national security 
policies (Kolobara, 2017, p. 53). "Information power is difficult 
to categorise because it cuts across all military, economic, 
social, and political resources of power, in some cases 
diminishing their power, in others multiplying it" (Nye and 
Owens, 1996, p. 22). Understanding the power of information 
is more important than ever, because the contemporary world 
is now witnessing an onslaught of manipulative images, 
where nations, groups, and individuals are trying to manage 
the messages they receive. 
Much of the information provided today, research, facts, 
statistics, explanations, and analyses eliminate the personal 
judgment and the capacity of an individual to form own opinion 
more certainly than the most twisted propaganda. This may 
come as a shock, but the fact is that excessive data does not 
enlighten the reader or the listener, but rather drown them, 
Ellul argues. 
Former US Director of the Information Operations Institute, 
Jole Harding, described the range of possible information 
operations activities: "honestly ... the goal of what you are 
trying to do is limited by your imagination and special forces 
tend to think a little differently... Information can be used to 
terrorise someone, or to create conditions where one does not 
want to do something, or all kinds of things” (Briant, 2015, p. 
12). He further explains that such actions, especially on the 
battlefield, can create chaos, distrust, suspicion, and even 
giving up the fight for one's cause. 
Modern information and communication technologies enable 








































 way practically impossible to control by the states. National 
borders are completely porous for all types of information 
flows, and barriers, artificial or natural, that once protected 
domestic public from unwanted foreign messages simply no 
longer work. World wide web and other erupting 
communication networks forever destroyed the power that 
once only governments had, and today's asymmetry gives the 
power of information to everyone. 
Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have made good 
use of the new media, harnessing the hunger of satellite 
television companies for news and using it to spread 
propaganda, show hostages and otherwise gain publicity. On 
the other hand, they count on the media to help them spread 
terror. Thousands were killed in the 9/11 attacks, but millions 
were terrified by the images provided by the media. Ayman 
al-Zawahiri once said, "that we are in a battle, and that more 
than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the 
media; a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of 
our Umma" (Arquilla and Borer, 2007, p. 86). Many argue that 
Al-Qaeda's success as a true player on the regional and 
global scene is more the result of an effective information 
strategy than of the military capabilities or inseparable political 
support it possesses. "Had Bin Laden had no access to global 
media, satellite communications and the Internet, he would 
have been just a grumpy guy in a cave," anti-terrorism expert 
David Kilcullen claims. 
However, according to experts, Al-Qaeda has become much 
more than an organisation. Due to an effective information 
strategy, it has become a powerful idea. "It is obvious that 
media warfare is one of the most effective methods in this 
century; it can actually achieve 90% of the results in the 
preparation for a battle," Osama bin Laden said (Gordan 
Akrap, Special War 1).  
Influencing the minds of the target audience requires 
identifying their psychological points or vulnerabilities. What 
can psychology do for warfare? A psychologist can pay 
attention to a particular person, to those elements of the 
human mind that are otherwise kept aside. They can show 
how to turn lust into anger, individual resourcefulness into 
mass cowardice, trust into distrust, prejudice into anger. They 
do so by going to the unconscious state of mind for the source 
of material. Secondly, a psychologist can set up techniques 
to discover how the enemy truly feels. Some of the worst 





































the state of the adversary’s mind. Beaufre argues that, with 
the addition of material factors, the art of battle consists of 
retaining and strengthening the psychological cohesion of 
one's troops while at the same time interfering with the 
enemy’s, hence the psychological factor is the key to success 
(Beaufre, 1965, p. 57). 
If, for example, one group is presented with fake documents 
or facts, fake statements of its leaders on the things that 
matter to them, this can create a sense of weakness that can 
very quickly lead to despair and be a tipping point that will 
result in the breaking of their will. Also, the perception of 
injustice is one of the strongest motives for encouraging 
attacks, including aggression and war. "The perception of 
injustice arises when there is a discrepancy between the real 
destiny and the one that an individual thinks (s)he deserves" 
(Lerner, 1981, p. 11). As the basic human motivation, people 
try to restore justice, including resorting to violence and 
aggression, especially when injustice is perceived as a threat 
to one's own worth (Baumeister and Boden, 1998, p. 111). 
History of warfare is the history of perceived injustice, be the 
injustice real, made or imaginary, Pratkanis points out. Forced 
influence creates anger and resistance. We have a general 
tendency to react against coercive influence, be that coercion 
based on the use of force or deception or is the result of other 
manipulative processes. This tendency, defined as 
psychological inductive resistance, arises when an individual 
perceives that his/her freedom or behaviour is restricted; it is 
a repulsive condition that motivates behaviour in order to 
restore the threatened freedom (Brehm, 1966). 
No one has done a better job of harnessing the anguish of 
Americans than the phrase war on terror, which the Bush 
administration frequently used between 2001 and 2009, 
Glassner claims. In this regard, former US National Security 
Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, wrote for the Washington Post 
(25th March 2007), “The little secret here is that the vagueness 
of the phrase was intentionally calculated by its sponsors. The 
constant reference to the war on terror achieved one 
important goal: it stimulated the emergence of a culture of 
fear. Fear blurs reason, intensifies emotions and makes it 
easier for demagogic politicians to mobilise the public in the 
name of the politics they wish to pursue." Whenever a group 
uses fear to manipulate another group, someone profits and 








































 One of the paradoxes of the culture of fear is that serious 
problems remain largely unnoticed, even though they actually 
pose a real threat to what the public fears most. The White 
House received the support it needed to attack Iraq by fuelling 
public fear of terrorism and associating it with Iraq. In the days 
before the attack, public support for the George W. Bush 
administration was 75%. Saddam Hussein was so 
successfully linked to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the 
public mind that in a New York Times poll in September 2006, 
long after the administration officially acknowledged that 
Hussein had nothing to do with the attacks, one third of 
Americans still thought that the Iraqi President was personally 
involved in them. FBI Director Robert Muller, when testifying 
before the Congressional Committee in February 2005, failed 
to emphasise the absence of terrorist attacks, failure to locate 
Al-Qaeda cells in the USA, or a report by his agency 
suggesting that Al-Qaeda may not have enough strength for 
a series of serious attacks in the USA. Instead, he was 
concerned. "I remain very concerned about what we don't 
see," he said. In his book Overblown, political scientist John 
Muller commented this by saying, "for the Bureau Director, the 
absence of evidence is clearly proof of existence." Other 
government agencies also had their own interests in inflating 
the threat of terrorism. Some did so to protect budgets. The 
DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) made presentations 
how drug trafficking profit funds terrorism while the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy spent millions on a campaign 
that labelled teenagers using marijuana as terrorist financiers 
(Cf. Gardner, 2009, pgs. 266-270 in Kolobara, 2017, pgs. 62-
63).  
When it comes to the power of global media in creating public 
opinion, it is important to emphasise that the attention given 
to a particular party, or topic, statements taken from 
participants in an event or movement, greatly influence and 
create public opinion, mainly because one side of the “truth” 
is being pushed for, and only "what suits us" is singled out 
from the other side, thus providing (viewed from the aspect of 
journalism) objective reporting but aimed at provoking a 
specific emotion in viewers, which ultimately causes that 
viewer(s) to take a side and be susceptible to the propaganda 
messages coming from that side. This type of reporting, when 
an audience for the first time comes across a topic or a 
particular phenomenon, comes as the initial information that 
becomes established as the truth and becomes a base camp 
from which certain activity starts, either intellectual or 





































negative or positive attitude about something encounters the 
influence of the media reporting differently from his/her 
attitude, (s)he (generally) automatically dismisses such 
reporting as incorrect and false and creates an even stronger 
conviction about the correctness of his/her opinion (Kolobara, 
2017, p. 198).   
Information operations’ impact 
Public opinion is the king, Sorenson argues, pointing out that 
from the White House to other major centres of power, 
everyone is waiting and establishing their actions on public 
opinion. It can lift people and ideas to great power but also 
break them overnight. Sometimes it can cause wars and 
sometimes it can stop them. For example, on the night that 
Congress voted on the Iraq war, President Bush told the 
nation and the Congress that Iraq is an evil nation that 
threatens American security. Over the next few years, all key 
members of his administration made similar warnings in their 
speeches. According to the Congressional Special 
Investigation Report for Rep. Henry A. Waxman on public 
statements made by Bush administration officials, namely 
Bush, Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld, Colin Powel, and 
Condoleezza Rice, these five officials made 237 specific false 
and misleading statements about the Iraqi threat in 125 public 
appearances (Iraq on the Record: The Bush Administration's 
Public Statements on Iraq). Bush claimed that the very 
survival of the United States was at stake. Tony Blair went 
further, saying that the entire West faces a danger that is "real 
and existential" (Gardner, 2009, p. 13). 
Attempts to isolate methods that are effective in changing 
strong beliefs show us that the key is in the volume and timing 
of the placement of contradictory information rather than in 
the quality. Large amounts of information presented in a short 
period of time have the greatest impact, Myers argues. The 
September 11 attacks on the United States are a prime 
example of the beliefs and attitudes that influence a final 
conclusion. Many enemies of the United States have come up 
with numerous theories that the US government had its 
fingers in the attack in some way. Of course, this is not true, 
but it turns out that the prejudice of those who dislike the 
United States have a key susceptibility to anything negative 
about the country. Rumours are most effective when triggered 
in a number of locations at the same time and in such a way 
that they go back and forth, with each new report apparently 








































 circulated among Iraqis about how US soldiers used their 
night vision goggles to spy on Muslim women and distributed 
pornographic content to children, played a major role in 
starting the fierce fighting in Iraqi Fallujah. A local Iraqi bakery 
acknowledged that "these rumours affected people in a 
negative way... They encouraged people to use their 
weapons against Americans" (Los Angeles Times, 14th June 
2003). 
Commenting on Western media coverage of Syria (2016), 
Canadian journalist Eva Bartlett said that "everything you hear 
and read in corporate media is the exact opposite of the 
reality." She points out that corporate Western media is 
engaged in planning regime change in Syria. She also said 
that she had been throughout Syria several times and that the 
people were giving a great deal of support to the President of 
the country, "and that this is contrary to what you read in 
corporate media like the BBC, the New York Times or The 
Guardian." She further states that those media reports are 
completely opposite to the reality and that they aim to 
demonise Assad and Russian support for Syria. In particular, 
Bartlett points out that all of those media rely on the Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights as its source, which is in fact 
a British organisation based in Coventry, England, with only 
one member. Bartlett cited the so-called White Helmets as an 
example of manipulation and explained that it was an 
organisation formed in 2013 by a former British officer and 
funded with $ 100 million from the US, UK and the EU. "They 
are supposed to be rescuing civilians in East Aleppo, but no 
one has heard of them there! The White Helmets are allegedly 
independent, but you can see them carrying weapons and 
standing next to the bodies of dead Syrian soldiers (Assad 
supporters). Their videos show the same children they use for 
different reports, so you may notice the girl Aja, who appears 
at different times in different locations” (www.bljesak.info, 15th 
December 2016). 
For example, in 2015 and 2016, numerous articles written by 
journalists were published in various Russian media, 
commenting on the Ukraine-EU deal. In short, the story was 
that in exchange for a visa-free regime with the EU, Ukraine 
committed to accepting refugees from the Middle East to its 
territory. Cover pages of newspapers in Russia were more 
than colourful, "EU will force Ukraine to accept migrants from 
Africa and Middle East", "Ukraine was offered to have 
migrants settle in exchange for visa-free regime with EU", 





































(Friedman, Ofer; Kabernik, Vitaly and Pearce, James C., 
2019, p. 161). Oxana Timofeyeva states that this is an 
example of a long-lasting information and psychological 
operation that revealed methods of direct lying and transfer of 
conclusions and derivatives, which is a specific case of 
transformation as well as the method of finding facts, that is, 
mixing fiction and reality. The main objective of this operation 
was to reconstruct the image of a negative future in the minds 
of the audience and discredit the government’s intentions 
using the European "problem" in Ukraine. 
Igor Nikolaychuk, on the other hand, gives examples of the 
Russian-American relations. He alleges that the US media 
demonized the Russian authorities in the case of Dima 
Yakovlev in 2012 and 2013. For every twenty to twenty-five 
negative articles on Russia, there came only ten neutral ones, 
with absolutely no positive articles. When it comes to the 
Ukraine case, the US media again labelled Russia the axis of 
evil. In August 2015, for every thirty to thirty-five negative 
articles came ten neutral ones. In September, after operations 
in Syria, there were ten neutral articles for every twenty-five 
negative ones about Russia (Nikolaychuk, Yakova and 
Yanglyaeva, 2016, pgs. 12-24). 
Research  
During October 2019, a sociological field survey was 
conducted on a sample of 600 citizens in three large BiH 
cities, Banja Luka, Sarajevo and Mostar. The aim of the 
research was to examine the public's level of knowledge 
about the terms and topics of hybrid threats and warfare and 
related activities. A total of 603 persons participated in the 
research, of which 48% were male (N = 286), 52% were 
female (N = 316), while one participant (N = 1) did not state 
his/her view when prompted.  
As for the age distribution, 46% (N=277) of the participant are 
aged 18-34, 37% (N=223) are aged 35-54, and 17% (N=103) 










































When asked, Do you know what Hybrid threats are, 59% (N 
= 353) of the participants said they did not know, 27% (N = 
166) knew about them, but did not know enough about it, and 
14% (N = 84) said they knew what they were. 
 
 
When asked Do you know what hybrid warfare is, 56% (N = 
334) of the participants stated that they did not know, 29% (N 
= 177) that they knew, but did not know enough about it, and 


























































When asked, Do you recognize malicious information activity 
in the media, 57% (N = 342) of the participants stated that 
they recognised it, 5% (N = 33) did not recognise it, and 38% 
(N = 228) recognised it partially. 
 
 
When asked, Do you think that the media in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are engaged in information warfare, 59% (N = 
358) of the participants stated that they thought it was, 12% 
(N = 71) did not think that, 29% (N = 174) did not know. 
 
 
When asked, Do you think that entity television companies 
present misinformation in their news programmes, 39% (N = 
310) of the participants said Yes, especially the FTV (the FBiH 
television, whose editorial policy is predominantly influenced 
by the Bosniak political elite); 32% (N = 248) Yes, especially 
RTRS (Republika Srpska Television, whose editorial policy is 
predominantly influenced by the ruling Serb political elite); 2% 




3. Do you recognise malicious 






4. Do you think that the media 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina are 











































When asked, Do you think that foreign power centres are 
conducting hybrid warfare in BiH, 44% (N = 267) of the 
participants said they thought they were, 14% (N = 84) did not 
think that, while 42% (N = 252) did not know. 
 
 
When asked, What are the biggest security threats in 21st 
century on the European continent, 8% (N = 55) said hybrid 
threats, 44% (N = 318) answered terrorism and migration, 






5. Do you think that entity 
television companies present 








6. Do you think that foreign 
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When asked, Through which media do you receive most of 
your information, 29% (N = 210) said via television, 64% (N = 
474) via the world wide web and social networks, and 7% (N 
= 50) said via radio and newspaper. 
 
 
Testing the relevance of difference in answers to the 
questions in view of gender  
Statistically relevant difference were established in view of 
gender in the responses to the question Do you recognise 
malicious information activity in the media (2 =4,23; df=1, 
p<0.05). More men, compared to women, said they 
recognised it, 63% of men to 51% of women; and in the 
responses to the question Do you think that foreign power 
centres are conducting hybrid warfare in BiH? (2 =2,18; 
df=1, p<0.05). More men, compared to women, said they did, 
50% of men to 39% of women. 
Statistically relevant difference were established in view of 
gender in the responses to the question Through which media 
do you receive most of your information (2 =3,85; df=1, 
p<0.05). More men in comparison to women said they 
received information via television, while more women 
received information via world wide web and social networks.  
1. Through which media do you receive most of your 
information? 
Gender Men Women 




8. Through which media do you 









































 Television 138 (48) 72 (22.78) 
World wide web and social 
networks 
143 (50) 242 (77) 
Radio and newspaper 4 (2) 2 (0.22) 
 
In case of other questions, no statistically relevant differences 
were found in the responses in view of gender.   
Testing the relevance of difference in answers to the 
questions in view of age 
Statistically relevant difference were established in view of 
age in the responses to the question Do you know what hybrid 
threats are (2=3,46; df=2, p<0.05). More older respondents 
(35-24 and 55-70) said they knew, when compared to the 
younger respondents (18-34). 
2. Do you know what hybrid threats are? 
Age  18-34 35-24 55-70 
Responses N (%) N (%) N (%) 
I do 14 (5) 46 (21) 24 (23) 
I don’t 192 (69)  101 (45) 60 (58) 
I’ve heard about it, but 
I don’t know enough 
about it  
71 (26) 75 (34) 18 (19) 
 
Also, in responses to the question Do you know what hybrid 
warfare is (2 =2,86; df=2, p<0.05), more older respondents 
(55-70 and 35-24) said they knew, when compared to the 
younger respondents (18-34) 20% and 28% to 7%.  
Age 18-34 35-24 55-70 
Responses N (%) N (%) N (%) 
I do 19 (7) 44 (20) 29 (28) 
I don’t 182 (66) 97 (44) 55 (54) 
I’ve heard about it, but 
I don’t know enough 
about it  






































Statistically relevant difference were established in view of 
age in the responses to the question Do you think that entity 
television companies present misinformation in their news 
programmes (2 =2,11; df=2, p<0.05). More older 
respondents (55-70 and 35-24) responded that it was the 
entity TV station FTV. 
When asked Do you think that foreign power centres are 
conducting hybrid warfare in BiH (2 =4,72; df=2, p<0.05), 
more older respondents (55-70 and 35-24) responded yes, 
57% and 66% to 28% (18-34). 
Statistically relevant difference were established in view of 
age in the responses to the question Through which media do 
you receive most of your information (2 =7,36; df=2, p<0.05). 
More older respondents said they received information via 
television, when compared to the younger respondents, while 
the youngest respondents (aged 18-34) receive most of their 
information via world wide web and social networks. 




Note: 2 – value of hi squared; df- degrees of freedom  <0.05 
considerably at 5 % 
 
Conclusion  
Information operations always present themselves to be what 
they are not. Their ideological base, while seemingly 
incoherent at first, is essentially an imitation of theological 
concepts of action targeting audience with only short-term 
activities that can be caused time and again. They are in fact 
Age 18-34 35-24 55-70 
Responses N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Television 57 (21) 94 (42) 59 (57) 
World wide web and 
social networks 
220 (79) 124 (56) 42 (41) 








































 a laboratory example of perfect copying, that is, imitation of 
what was relayed, into another context of action. In a religious 
context, any questioning of religious authority is considered 
impermissible, and one who does so is described in the worst 
terms. The same was manage to be achieved in information 
operations. The only credible source right now is the position 
of authority (media, that is, institutions and other positions of 
the ruling elite) that draws authority over “truth”, which must 
not be doubted, from the very position of authority and need 
not rationally justify it. It is enough that it is convincingly 
repeated countless times, that is, presented in different ways 
in order to create the illusion of intellectual diversity. Media 
information should only be viewed as an appearance on the 
surface, as a form filled with content of interest character 
packed into a seemingly objective phenomenon. Judging the 
most important things on the basis of the first impression and 
media rumours is often a bad and incorrect judgment 
precisely because based on what you saw you can only 
discern the surface (which is often deceptive), while based on 
what you hear, you can only discern misinformation that 
suggests a completely opposite conclusion. The sharpness of 
judging the effect of an information action is inversely 
proportional to the immediate proximity of the object in a 
development. The closer you are, the less reasonably you 
see, and more act in the heat of the moment, while things get 
clearer the more you move away and the less emotionally 
involved you are. The goal of the present-day media 
information operations is to overthrow reality, i.e. to establish 
imposed perceptions and understandings that lead to the 
same way of thinking that will ultimately trigger the desired 
action. The nature of the targeted information for a particular 
recipient will always be negative from at least one point of 
view, because its value determinant is formed depending on 
the position of interpretation. We primarily need to be 
interested in the structure of information in the whole context 
of events, in its awareness and then in its content. 
Criticisms of modern security concepts navigates towards 
attacking the universal supervision introduced by states as a 
practice. Emphasis is placed on the fact that our constantly 
monitored behaviour is reduced to slow simmering in the 
world of convenience, to conformist behaviour, self-
censorship, and mere consumerism presented as freedom of 
choice. Emphasis is also on the fact that our whole personality 
is presented to the public, and that all those who think they 
should not be afraid because they are doing nothing wrong 





































end, it all comes down to the individual's autonomy being 
erased under the guise of the individual as a new reference 
object of security. The contemporary intelligence apparatus 
no longer needs (to such an extent) agents who will "hunt" 
citizens (targets) around the country. Nowadays, this is done 
by the computers monitoring their activities through 
smartphones, social networks, CCTV, credit cards, etc. 
Security thinking and positioning must be updated in line with 
technological changes. In the past, human political 
aspirations were aiming for freedom, while "in the political 
present day" they are permanently imprisoned in the domain 
of safety and comfort. If the theory that history is the teacher 
of life is correct, then countries do not have to wonder whether 
there will be a war, but when it will begin. Therefore, the 
military category of security for the state (in the broadest 
sense), in the long run, still remains, or must remain, in the 
first place.  
Hybrid threats and wars are the new security modus operandi 
of the 21st century and will certainly remain a current topic for 
several decades to come. They have demonstrated their 
effectiveness and pervasiveness in numerous international 
conflicts and operations, irreversibly affecting their final 
outcome. It is the diversity, the polyvalence of the tools they 
use, and the totality and the omnipresence of the operational 
knowledge, skills and reach they produce that make them the 
scary category of operational threats that represents all the 
best that military, intelligence, propaganda, and cyber 
capabilities and experiences can deliver today. 
Research conducted in BiH on knowledge of the concept and 
terms of hybrid threats and warfare and related activities 
found that the general population is largely unaware of what 
hybrid threats and hybrid wars are. Thus, many of those who 
answered affirmatively about their knowledge (mostly the 
older population) most often confused hybrid threats with 
agricultural terminology and actions in the comments they 
made orally after completing the survey. 44% of respondents 
believe that foreign power centres are conducting hybrid 
warfare in BiH and express negative opinions and emotions 
about the interference of the foreign political factor in BiH. 
Only 8% of respondents identify hybrid threats as the biggest 
security threat in the 21st century on the European continent, 
while the majority 48% label political extremism as the 
greatest threat to European security in 21st century. The 
survey also found that 64% of those surveyed use the world 








































 information, compared to 29% of those who use television. 
Majority of respondents rated themselves as recognising 
malicious information activity in the media, found that the 
media in BiH (referring to state entity broadcasters) were 
conducting information warfare and labelled the FBiH 
Television (39% of respondents) as the one broadcasting 
misinformation in its news programme. Accordingly, a 
conclusion can be reached that entity television reporting 
should be viewed using a holistic approach, that is, one that 
says that details and particular phenomena must always be 
viewed in a context. There is no doubt whatsoever that this 
context is driven by some particular interest(s) and for 
someone’s benefit. 
In the end, the human psyche works the same way it did 2 or 
3 thousand years ago. People have not changed, only 
technology has. Today, we need a security-information 
capability to see, to discern, and consequently, not respond. 
You cannot change the way foreign security and political 
media gravity works, but you can adapt and utilise it. If 
something sounds as a fact it does not necessarily mean it is 
a fact. After all, facts no longer matter, only narrative does. 
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